This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is voluntary, players do not reveal private information in the process of alliance formation in any equilibrium. In this case there exists a pooling equilibrium without alliances with a unique effort choice in the contest and there exist equilibria in which all types prefer to form an alliance. If the formation of an alliance can be enforced by one player with positive probability there exists an equilibrium in which only the low types prefer to form an alliance.
Introduction
The central element of the model presented in this paper is a rent seeking game as introduced by Tullock (1980) with incomplete information as studied by Wasser (2013) and Ewerhart (2014) . We focus on the Alliance Formation Puzzle as described by Konrad (2009) and show two aspects: i) the puzzle can be overcome by rational agents and ii) rational agents avoid to reveal private information in the alliance formation process, if alliance formation is voluntary. Jia, Skaperdas, and Vaidya (2013) argue that the Tullockcontest success function is well motivated by an axiomatic foundation, by stochastic functional forms or by microfounded search models. Without the simple structure of the Tullock-contest success function the model studied in the paper at hand does not seem to be tractable. There is a large number of contributions to the literature on rent seeking games with asymmetric valuations 1 and a smaller number number of contributions in which individual valuations are private information, see for example Hurley and Shogren (1998) for one sided incomplete information. Malueg and Yates (2004) study a model in which the prior of the private values is potentially correlated. Ewerhart (2010) fully characterizes the Bayesian equilibrium for symmetric rent-seeking contests with independent private valuations and Ewerhart (2014) shows uniqueness of the equilibrium for continuous types. Fey (2008) and Wasser (2013) introduce informational asymmetries on the costs of effort provision. In Morath and Münster (2013) players may acquire information on their valuations, and opponents observe whether or not information was acquired but do not learn the information. The central question which is studied in the paper which I offer is in how far agents truthfully reveal their private information in a pre-stage and in which way this influences behavior in the subsequent contest. Katsenos (2009) studies agents who send a signal on their private information before entering the contest. He shows that a separation of types in equilibrium is only possible, if opponents are weak with an a priori high probability. In this paper we allow for any probability on the set of types, our results do not depend on this probability. Zhang (2008) and Münster (2009) study a repeated contest in which the level of effort provision in the first stage reveals information on the private valuation in the second stage. Münster (2009) finds that high ability contestants aim at concealing their type by choosing a low effort in the first stage in equilibrium. Skaperdas (1998) studies a model of alliance formation between three players who compete for one prize. 2 In his model players have heterogeneous and observable types. Skaperdas gives sufficient conditions for the contest success function such that only 'weak' types respectively only 'strong' types voluntarily form an alliance. Herbst, Konrad, and Morath (2015) test a similar version of this model in an experimental setup but restrict all players to have the same valuation. Yet their experimental findings indicate that agents have some underlying and unobservable type which both influences the level of effort provision and causes a selection effect in the first stage of the game. The model which we present in the next section assumes an underlying unobservable type and analyzes the sequential Bayesian game. We show that if alliance formation is voluntary, type contingent alliance-formation is strictly unstable for a standard contest success function. In contrast the setup of Skaperdas (1998) implies that alliance formation is weakly stable for both weak and strong players, if the standard success function is applied. If the formation of an alliance can be enforced with some probability, as in Herbst, Konrad, and Morath (2015) , we derive a lower bound for the strong type such that their empirical finding can be supported by an equilibrium.
Model
We consider a game with three risk neutral expected utility maximizers. Assume that player i's preferences for a lottery that allocates one prize to i with probability p ∈ [0, 1] is represented by the function
for v i ∈ {1,v},v ≥ 1. One motive forv > 1 could be the 'joy of winning' 3 , where we would regardv close to one. We characterize a player with v i = 1 as 'weak' and a player with v i =v as 'strong'. The valuation v i is known only to player i. The commonly known independent and identical a priori probability of receiving v i = 1 is denoted by q ∈ (0, 1).
The game consists of two stages; in the first stage players one and two may publicly declare whether or not they are willing to form an alliance. Player i declares a i = yes, if he prefers to form an alliance and a i = no otherwise. If no player prefers to form an alliance, no alliance forms. If one player prefers and the other player does not prefer to form an alliance, the alliance forms with probability γ ∈ [0, 1]. 4 If both players prefer to form an alliance, the alliance forms with certainty. After stage 1 all players observe whether or not players one and two prefer an alliance and whether or not the alliance actually forms. We denote the event of alliance formation by A = A and its complement by A = ¬A. The publicly available information of stage 1 is captured by a = (a 1 , a 2 , A). In the second stage the contest takes place 3 See Sheremeta (2010) and each player i simultaneously chooses a number e i ≥ 0. The rules of the contest depend on whether players one and two form an alliance or not.
Payoffs
We consider the standard Tullock contest success function, where p i (e) = e i j e j for e : j e j > 0 and p i (e) = 1 3 if j e j = 0. The probability that player three wins the contest is given by p i (e) in any case; the probility that players one or two win the contest is given by p i (e), if there is no alliance. Then, the utility function is given by
We assume that if the alliance forms and one member of the alliance wins the contest, the prize is distributed with uniform probability among all members of the alliance. 5
If an alliance between players one and two forms and j e j > 0, players one and two expect to receive u i (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 |A) = e 1 + e 2 e 1 + e 2 + e 3 · v i 2 − e i , i = 1, 2 .
If an alliance forms but j e j = 0, players 1 and 2 expect to receive
If we would model the within alliance allocation of the prize using a within alliance contest, our use of the standard Tullock contest success function would imply that the payoff functions with and without alliance would coincide. Note that a uniform within alliance assignment of the prize strictly increases the incentives to form an alliance.
Strategies
A choice for player i = 1, 2 in stage 1 is a mapping
A choice for player i = 1, 2, 3 in stage 2 is a mapping
A strategy for player i = 1, 2 is a pair of mappings a i and e i .
Beliefs
Player i believes that another player j has a low valuation with probability µ j . µ j depends on the other player's choice a j in the first stage. Clearly the beliefs of players one and two for player three equal the prior probability q of having a low valuation. In a separating equilibrium the beliefs for the types of players one and two equal zero or one, in a pooling equilibrium these beliefs equal the prior probabilities.
Denote by the vectorẽ the beliefs of the players over the 2nd-stage choices of the other players given a ∈ {yes, no} 2 × {¬A, A} and v ∈ {1,v}.
Equilibrium
The strategies {(a 1 , e 1 ), (a 2 , e 2 ), (e 3 )} and beliefs µ,ẽ are a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if
• the beliefs are formed using Bayes' rule (if possible) given the strategies and
• the strategies maximize expected payoffs given the beliefs.
In the following section we analyze equilibria with partial information revelation (separating equilibria) and equilibria with no information revelation (pooling equilibria).
Analysis
In this section we derive the necessary conditions for optimal behavior in the second stage of the game given arbitrary beliefs. In the following sections we successively solve for different scenarios of 1st-stage behavior in pure strategies. These different scenarios allow us to restrict attention to cases in which the beliefs µ i assume values in {0, q, 1}. If the alliance does not form, then each player i = 1, 2, 3 or if the alliance does form, then only player i = 3 maximizes the following expected payoff function which depends on the beliefs µ j (a j ), µ k (a k ) andẽ j ,ẽ k for j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j, k = i, j = k (where µ j (a j ) = q for j = 3):
The first order condition to this maximization problem is satisfied by the optimal choice e i (a, v i ) of player i:
where e i (a, v i ) = 0 whenever the inequality is strict.
If there is an alliance, player i = 1, 2 maximizes (with j = 1, 2 j = i):
The optimal choice e i (a, v i ) for i = 1, 2 satisfies
Note that all players face a strictly concave maximization problem. Therefore any belief has a unique best response.
Separating Equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium the action a i of the first stage implies a belief µ i (a i ) which is either equal to zero or equal to one for i = 1, 2. Hereby, players one and two reveal their private information after the first stage. In the second stage, all players know the valuations of players one and two and whether there is an alliance between players one and two or not. There are eight cases on which all players can condition their second stage choices: case # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 valuation of player 1 v 1 1 1 1 1vvvv valuation of player 2 v 2 1 1vv 1 1vv formation of an alliance A ¬A A A ¬A A ¬A ¬A A Note that cases 2 and 4 and also cases 3 and 5 are symmetric. Note further that in symmetric pure strategy equilibria cases 0 and 1 and also cases 6 and 7 are mutually exclusive.
In each of the eight cases inequalities (1) and (2) simplify substantially and we are able to derive each of the solutions in closed form as functions of the parametersv > 1 and q ∈ (0, 1). We present these solutions in appendix A. Table 1 lists these solutions for the particular valuesv = 2 and q = 1 2 .
Inequalities (1) and / or (2) imply polynomials of degree four (if binding).
The key to the solution is inequality (1) for player three. If (1) is binding for i = 3, the solution satisfies (e 1 + e 2 + e 3 (v 3 )) 2 = v 3 · (e 1 + e 2 ), which can be substituted in (1) or (2) for players one and two and simplifies the problem substantially.
Note further for the cases in which an alliance forms, A = A, that the only difference in inequality (2) for players one and two is the difference in the valuations v i and v j . If v 1 = v 2 , inequality (2) must be strict for the player with the lower valuation and that player chooses zero effort, irrespective of the magnitude of the difference in v 1 and v 2 . A tiny heterogeneity suffices that one player rides on the back of the other.
( In all cases but the two cases in which v 1 = v 2 and A = A, the solutions are unique. In the two remaining cases, table 1 lists the unique symmetric solutions. We argue why we can focus on the symmetric solutions without loss of generality in subsection (3.2).
Before we continue the analysis, suppose for a moment that players one and two mutually know their valuations at the beginning of the game. Then in any case player i = 1, 2 prefers to form an alliance with the other player if and only if v i = 1. This observation is true for general parameter values v > 1 and q ∈ (0, 1). In subsections 3.2 and 3.3 we study whether this observation carries over to the case of incomplete information.
Only The Strong Stand Alone
In this subsection we analyze the following first stage-choices for players one and two:â
Given these choices all players learn the valuations v 1 and v 2 after stage 1 (and mutually know this). Therefore, µ i (yes) = 1 and µ i (no) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
Note that cases 0 and 7 cannot emerge. If an alliance requires consent (γ = 0), cases 2 and 4 cease to exist while if an alliance can be enforced by one player (γ = 1), cases 3 and 5 cease to exist.
In case v 1 = 1, v 2 = 1,â = (yes, yes, A) there is a continuum of mutually optimal choices. All efforts of players one and two that sum up to v · 1+q·( √v −1) 1+2·v+q·(v−1) 2 are mutually optimal. 6 Clearly, player one prefers those pairs of mutually optimal efforts, which imply a lower effort for player one. If players one and two exert asymmetric efforts, the outcome is less attractive to the player with the higher effort who then might have stronger incentives to deviate from the decision in the first stage. If we can show that symmetric effort choices in the second stage imply a deviation in the first stage, then asymmetric effort choices would all the more imply a deviation in the first stage. By no means we suggest that the symmetric case is most plausible.
While table 1 includes the mutually optimal effort choices and utilities along the potential equilibrium path, we need to derive the optimal effort choices and utilities after a unilateral and unexpected deviation.
Optimal Effort Choices After A Unilateral Deviation
We turn now to optimal choices of player one in stage 2 after a deviation of player one toã 1 (v 1 = 1) = no orã 1 (v 1 =v) = yes in stage 1. In this case players two and three believe that players one and two use the strategyâ 1 and a 2 . Therefore, the actual choice e 1 does not equal player three's beliefẽ 1 and hence inequality (1) cannot be used to simplify the optimization problem as before. While it is straight forward to show that player one's maximization problem is strictly concave and therefore has a unique maximizer, we cannot provide a solution in closed form. Instead, we derive the solutions numerically and denote them byë 1 . For this reason we focus on the specification q = 1 2 andv = 2. The derivation is illustrated in appendix B. In section 3.2.3 we argue that these results hold for a general range of the parameterv. Table 2 lists the utilities of player one derived from optimal choices of player one after a deviation fromâ 1 toã 1 given that players two and three behave in the belief that player one usesâ 1 instead ofã 1 . Table 2 : utilities of player one for optimal deviations
Alliance Formation in Stage 1
The following game tree summarizes the findings for the case in which player two usesâ 2 and in which players two and three believe that player one useŝ a 1 : 
Figure 1: Reduced game tree from the perspective of player 1. The numbers are the expected utilities of player 1. Bold numbers indicate analytical derivations.
In stage 1 player one does not know v 2 and whether or not a unilateral offer suffices for an alliance. Figure 2 illustrates player one's expected utility derived fromâ 1 andã 1 using the priors q = 1 2 and γ ∈ (0, 1).
Figure 2: Expected utilities of player i in stage 1
We may conclude that player i = 1, 2 with v i = 1 does not have an incentive to deviate toã i (v i = 1) = no, if γ > γ = 0.2423 and that player i = 1, 2 with v i = 2 does not have an incentive to deviate toã i (v i = 2) = yes, if γ <γ = 0.7189.
Proposition 1 (Separating Equilibrium) Forv = 2 and q = 1 2 , there is an open set (γ,γ) ⊂ (0, 1) with 1 2 ∈ (γ,γ) such that the choice to offer an alliance if and only if v i = 1 is part of a strategy of a separating equilibrium if and only if γ ∈ (γ,γ). More precisely:
Appendices A and B summarize the optimal choices in the second stage.
In this section we derive optimal behavior for the parameter specification v = 2 and q = 1 2 . We derive equilibrium choices as closed form solutions in the parametersv, q and γ. We derive the choices in the second stage that follow deviation choices in the first stage numerically. The reader can verify these numerical results using very simple means at any precision that is desirable. We present the results with a four digit precision. The next subsection applies this methodology for a broader specification of the parameterv.
Optimal Alliance Formation forv ∈ [1, 3]
By repeating the procedure for anyv ∈ (1, 3] (holding q = 1 2 fixed) we can illustrate the dependence ofγ and γ, the upper and lower bound for γ onv in 0 and that γ > 0 for allv ∈ (1, 3], which results in the following observations: If γ = 1 2 (as in Herbst, Konrad, and Morath (2015) ), the choiceâ i can be supported as part of an equilibrium strategy if and only if the unobservable high valuation is large enough (v ≥ 1.3908). If there is only little heterogeneity (v is close to 1), the range for admissable values for γ collapses to a tiny interval close to zero with the interpretation that an alliance forms only if both players agree to form an alliance.
Only The Weak Stand Alone
In this subsection we analyze the consequences of the choicẽ
in stage 1. We show that this choice in the first stage of the game cannot be a part of a separating equilibrium. As in subsection 3.2, players one and two reveal their valuations after stage 1 such that we can conduct backwards induction. The beliefs collapse to µ i (a i = yes) = 0 and µ i (a i = no) = 1 for i = 1, 2. Appendix A lists the mutually optimal effort choices and utilities. We then assume that player one unilaterally deviates in stage 1 and derive player one's best responses to the choices of players two and three who believe that player one chooses according toã 1 in stage 1. For the same reasons as in section 3.2 we have to derive these best responses numerically for the specific values of the parametersv = 2 and q = 1 2 . Finally, we show that for each γ ∈ [0, 1] there is a type v i ∈ {1, 2} such that player i = 1, 2 has an incentive to deviate from the strategyã i . We argue that this result generalizes to anȳ v ∈ (1, 3].
Optimal Effort Choices After A Unilateral Deviation
We turn now to optimal choices of player one after a unilateral deviation of player one fromã 1 toâ 1 , where players two and three choose their efforts in the belief that player one followsã 1 . We list the maximal utilities for player one in table 3. The reader can verify these numbers by using the information provided in appendix C. The game tree which would summarize the findings for the case in which player two chooses according toã 2 and players two and three believe that player one also chooses according toã 1 equals the game tree of figure 1 except for the payoffs at the first and the last end node, which are given by Figure 4 depicts the utility of player one with v 1 given that player two chooses the equilibrium candidate strategyã 2 and believes that player one also does so. A player with v i = 1 has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium candidate strategy in the first stage, if γ < γ and a player with v i = 2 has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium candidate strategy in the first stage, if γ >γ. Asγ < γ, the candidate strategyã i of this section is not an equilibrium strategy. Proposition 2 summarizes this result:
Proposition 2 For any γ ∈ [0, 1], there is a type v i ∈ {1, 2} such that player i with type v i has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium candidate
is not part of an equilibrium strategy.
Optimal Alliance Formation forv ∈ (1, 3]
The result of the previous subsection -thatã i is not a part of an equilibrium strategy forv = 2 -generalizes to the parameter rangev ∈ (1, 3]. All the calculations done for the casev = 2 and q = 1 2 are repeated for eachv ∈ (1, 3]. Figure 5 summarizes the dependence of the lower bound γ and upper bound γ for a potential interval of probabilities γ such that the choiceã i would be an equilibrium choice. As there is nov such that γ <γ, the respective interval [γ,γ] is empty for allv ∈ (1, 3]. 
All Stand Alone
In this section we derive a pooling equilibrium in which players one and two reject to form an alliance -regardless of their respective valuation. In this section we allow for any probability q ∈ (0, 1) for having a valuation v i = 1 and for any high valuationv ≥ 1.
Suppose agents choose a i (v i ) = no for v i ∈ {1,v} and i = 1, 2 in the first stage of the game. Then there is no agent who receives new information about the valuations of the other players after stage 1 to update the beliefs along the unique game path that receives positive probability. Along this path there is no alliance in stage 2. In the second stage the choices of players i = 1, 2, 3 satisfy inequality (1) with µ i (no) = q, i = 1, . . . , 3. We may exploit symmetry such that e i (v) =: e(v) for i = 1, 2, 3 and v ∈ {1,v}, which reduces the first order conditions to:
where inequality (3) is strict, if e(1) = 0 and (4) is strict, if e(v) = 0.
Proposition 3 For each q ∈ (0, 1) andv > 1 there exist positive e * (1) and e * (v) that satisfy inequalities (3) and (4).
We prove the proposition in appendix D. The proof makes use of the implicit function theorem and Brouwer's fixed point theorem.
Figure 6 depicts combinations of e(1) and e(v) such that conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied for parameter values q = 1 2 andv = 2.
0.4769 0.1701 Figure 6 : Condition (3) is satisfied along the curve going from west to east and condition (4) is satisfied along the curve going from south to north. Here, q = 1 2 andv = 2.
While we cannot obtain a solution e * (1|q,v), e * (v|q,v) in explicit form, we can solve conditions (3) and (4) for particular values of q andv numerically. For example, if q = 1 2 andv = 2 we have e * 1 (1) = e * 2 (1) = e * 3 (1) ≈ 0.1701 and e * 1 (2) = e * 2 (2) = e * 3 (2) ≈ 0.4769 .
Given these strategies, expected utilities are
Fortunately we do not need to know the explicit solution of equations (3) and (4) to prove the existence of a pooling equilibrium. The line of proof is as follows: any player can assure a payoff of zero by choosing e(v i ) = 0. As the utility functions are strictly concave any mutually optimal positive effort choices must induce a positive payoff. We specifiy (extremely pessimistic) beliefs for the off-equilibrium paths induced by at least one offer to form an alliance in stage 1 such that the maximal (believed) payoff a player can hope for is equal to zero. Given these beliefs, a deviation in the first stage is not profitable.
Proposition 4 For each q ∈ (0, 1) andv ≥ 1 there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which all players reject to form an alliance.
Proof : Denote the payoffs given the solutions e * (1) and e * (v) for general parameters q ∈ (0, 1) andv > 1 by u * (1) and u * (v). Clearly, u * (1), u * (v) > 0.
Consider now a deviation of player j ∈ {1, 2} toâ j = yes. Given that a i = no for i = 1, 2, i = j, this deviation may or may not enforce an alliance between players one and two. If a j = no is part of the equilibrium, then Bayes' rule does not apply in the information set withâ j = yes and any beliefsẽ can be used as equilibrium beliefs. Assume that the deviating player j believes that player three choosesẽ 3 =v. Given these beliefs, it is optimal for player j to chooseê j (1) =ê j (v) = 0, which implies utility zero. Therefore, given these beliefs it does not pay to deviate from the equilibrium strategy which demands that a i (v i ) = no for i = 1, 2 and v i ∈ {1,v}.
The pooling equilibrium which we have just proven to exist might seem unsatisfactory because its construction relies on maximally pessimistic beliefs. The next propostion states that any beliefs that support the choices (no, no) in equilibrium induce the same behavior in the second stage along the equilibrium path.
Theorem 1 For each q ∈ (0, 1) andv > 1 the choices in stage 2 along the equilbrium path are unique for any Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which all players reject to form an alliance in stage 1.
Appendix D proves this statement. The main argument of the proof is that the best respond curve for v i = 1 must hit the best respond curve for v i =v from the same side in any fixed point. If there were several fixed points, this would not be possible.
All Stand Together
In this section we analyze the first-stage choices a i (v i ) ≡ yes for i = 1, 2 and v i = 1,v. As in section 3.4 players cannot update their beliefs after stage 1 and µ i = q for i = 1, 2, 3. We know from section 3.2 that there may by multiple effort choices which are mutually optimal, if players one and two form an alliance in stage 1. Therefore, in contrast to section 3.4 we do not have unique equilibrium choices in stage 2 and we can only prove existence of an equilibrium. In the following we show that there exists a symmetric equilibrium. For the choices of players one and two symmetry implies e 1 (v) = e 2 (v) =: e(v) , v ∈ {1,v}. e(1) and e(v) satisfy (2) which simplifies to
where e(1) = 0, if (5) is strict and e(v) = 0, if (6) is strict.
The choices of player three satisfy (1) which simplify to q 2 · e(1) (e 3 (1)+2e (1)
and
where e 3 (1) = 0, if inequality (7) is strict and e 3 (v) = 0, if inequality (8) is strict.
If q = 1 2 , we can derive a symmetric equilibrium numerically with positive effort choices for eachv ≥ 1. Figure 7 illustrates the effort choices along the equilibrium path.
ln (1) ln (5) ln ( In appendix E we argue that for any q andv ≥ 1 at least three inequalities must be binding in any symmetric equilibrium and that the choices for a given high valuationv tend to infinity asv → ∞. Hereby it is straight forward to see that if (7) is binding for large enoughv, then (5) must be strict, if q is close enough to zero. Therefore in contrast to section 3.4 we cannot simply treat conditions (5) to (8) as a system of equations. Robinson (1991) provides an instruction of how the implicit function theorem can be applied, if the underlying function is 'nonsmooth'. We extract the essential step for our special setting of his general analysis in lemma 1. 8 For this purpose we need to define the projection of some vector u ∈ R 4 on the non-negative reals: u + = (max{u 1 , 0}, . . . , max{u 4 , 0}). Suppose there is a function F (u, y) that represents four inequalities for four choices y ∈ R 4 and the optimal reactions u ∈ R 4 to y. Lemma 1 states that any root of the auxiliar function F (u + , y) + u + − u implys a solution to the inequalities represented by F (·, ·). This is the key argument which allows us to use the implicit function theorem as in the proof of lemma 3 in appendix D.
Lemma 1 If for a given function F :
Proposition 5 states that there exist symmetric effort choices which are mutually optimal given that players one and two of any type v ∈ {1,v} form an alliance in stage 1.
Proposition 5
i There exists a vector e * = (e * (1), e * 3 (1), e * (v), e * 3 (v)) ∈ R 4 + wich satisfies inequalities (5) to (8).
Any such vector satisfies
ii e * (1) + e * 3 (1) > 0, e * (1) ≤ e * (v), e * 3 (1) ≤ e * 3 (v), e * (v), e * 3 (v) > 0 and iii limv →∞ e * (1) = q 2 · 1 18 , limv →∞ e * 3 (1) = q 2 · 2 9 and e * (v), e * 3 (v) −→ v→∞ ∞ and iv limv →1 e * (1), e * (v) = 1 18 , limv →∞ e * 3 (1), e * 3 (v) = 2 9 . The proof in appendix E firstly proves α-versions of statements i to ii for some small but positive α and then uses α − ii to show that i is also satisfied for α = 0. Statements iii and iv follow directly.
Any strictly positive equilibrium effort choice induces a positive equilibrium payoff, because the utility function is concave in the own effort-level.
Given that there exist mutually optimal effort choices in stage 2 after all types of player one and two choose yes in stage 1 we need to construct beliefs that support these choices in stage 1. As in the equilibrium 'all stand alone', the following (extremely pessimistic) beliefs induce zero payoffs off the equilibrium path: if at least one player chooses no in stage 1, players one and two believe that player three chooses e 3 =v. The best responses of players one and two to this belief is to choose e i = 0 in stage 2, i = 1, 2, which results in a payoff of zero.
Corollary 1 There exists a pooling equilibrium in which players one and two choose yes in stage 1. Skaperdas (1998) The model at hand differs to the model of Skaperdas (1998) with respect to the following aspects:
A Comparison to
1. We use the standard Tullock contest success function [CSF] whereas Skaperdas (1998) allows for more general functions.
2. Skaperdas (1998) allows only for voluntary alliance formation whereas we allow for a probabilistic unilateral enforcement of an alliance which we capture by the parameter γ ∈ [0, 1].
3. In Skaperdas (1998) the members of the winning alliance need to conduct a second contest to allocate the good whereas the paper at hand implicitly assumes that the members of the winning alliance perfectly collude in this second contest and allocate the good randomly.
4. In the paper at hand the valuations of the opponents are unknown to all players whereas Skaperdas (1998) assumes complete information.
Firstly we may compare our results only to those results of Skaperdas (1998) which apply for the standard Tullock CSF and secondly which are valid for γ = 0. Thirdly we need to be aware that our model is much more in favor towards the formation of alliances than the model of Skaperdas (1998) . With 4. we are able to identify the implication of incomplete information in the model of alliance formation.
According to Proposition 1 of Skaperdas (1998) there exist two players who voluntary form an alliance in the case of the standard Tullock CSF. In Proposition 2, Skaperdas (1998) provides sufficient conditions on the CSF for the identification of the types who voluntary form an alliance. The standard Tullock CSF does not satisfy these sufficient conditions; in this trivial case any type combination would voluntarily form an alliance under complete information and with a competitive secondary contest. In our model with a collusive secondary contest, incomplete information, γ = 0 and the standard Tullock CSF Proposition 1 is still valid: there exist two players who voluntarily form an alliance. In contrast to Proposition 2, the alliance is formed by any combination of types. In particular we argue that there is no voluntary alliance formation with type revelation, where only the weak players or only the strong players form an alliance. The unique voluntary alliance is the one in which players prefer to form an alliance regardless of their respective type, which can only be support by extremely pessimistic beliefs.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze a three player game with two stages in which firstly two of the three players may opt to form an alliance and secondly all players compete in a standard Tullock (1980) contest. This model is motivated by the experiments described in Herbst, Konrad, and Morath (2015) . Here, we analyze a variant in which all players have private valuations for the prize. In the experiments alliances can be enforced by a single player with probability 1 2 , or in our variant with some probability γ ∈ [0, 1]. We focus on a situation in which players use the first-stage-decision of group formation as an informative signal on the unobservable valuations. In particular we characterize a separating equilibrium in which players with a low valuation offer to form an alliance, players with a high valuation reject to form an alliance, update their beliefs accordingly and choose optimal levels of effortprovision in the second stage. We show that this equilibrium exists only if the parameter γ is close enough to 1 2 . If γ = 0, any first stage equilibrium decision is uninformative regarding the types of the players. We show that a strategy in which only high types form an alliance is not part of any equilibrium for any parameter values. We proove existence of the two pooling equilibria in which either all types form an alliance or reject to form an alliance. We show that all equilibria in which no player-type prefers to form an alliance induce the same choices along the equilibrium path.
Appendices
A Optimal Efforts For Known (v 1 , v 2 ), And A We present the optimal choices e 1 (v 1 , v 2 , A), e 2 (v 1 , v 2 , A) and e 3 (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , A) that satisfy conditions (1) and / or (2) and the corresponding utilities of players one and two. Define the following constants: (1) and (2) are satisfied by all e 1 , e 2 ≥ 0 such that
The exact solutions to conditions (1) and (2) are given by
The exact solutions to condition (1) are given by
The exact solutions to condition (1) are given by (1) and (2) are satisfied by all e 1 , e 2 ≥ 0 such that
In this case, the optimal choices of players one and two are not determined uniquely.
B Only The Strong Stand Alone -Optimal Deviation Effortsë
We derive the optimal effort choices that follow a unilateral deviation fromâ 1 toã 1 in stage 1 numerically and therefore need to assign specific numbers to the parameters. We choosev = 2 and q = 1 2 . Players two and three believe that player one usesâ 1 (v 1 = 1) = yes andâ 1 (v 1 = 2) = no. Table 4 lists the function values of the optimal effort choices of players two and three if they believe to be in one of the six cases for the parameter valuesv = 2 and q = 1 2 . The corresponding functions are presented in appendix A. Figure 8 illustrates the best responses of player one to the choices of players two and three who believe to be in the cases one to six. case (v 1 , v 2 ) (a 1 , a 2 , A) e 2 (a, v 2 ) e 3 (a, v 3 = 1) e 3 (a, v 3 = 2) #1: (1, 1 
C Only The Weak Stand Alone -Optimal Deviation Effortsë
We derive the optimal effort choices that follow a unilateral deviation fromã 1 toâ 1 in stage 1 numerically and therefore need to assign specific numbers to the parameters. We choosev = 2 and q = 1 2 . Players two and three believe that player one usesã 1 (v 1 = 1) = no andã 1 (v 1 = 2) = yes. Table 4 lists the function values of the optimal effort choices of players two and three if they believe to be in one of the six cases for the parameter valuesv = 2 and q = 1 2 . The corresponding functions are presented in appendix A. Table 5 : optimal effort choices of players two and three who believe that v 1 =v, if a 1 = yes and v 1 = 1, if a 1 = no forv = 2 and q = 1 2 . Figure 9 illustrates the best responses of player one to the choices of players two and three who believe to be in the cases #0 to #7. (3) and (4), then e(1) and e(v) are positive and the inequalities are binding.
Proof : The left hand side of (3) tends to ∞ for e(1) → 0 and the left hand side of (4) tends to ∞ for e(v) → 0. Hence e(1), e(v) > 0 and both inequalities must be binding.
The existence of an equilibrium heavily relies on the existence of the intersection of the two curves defined by (3) and (4). The next lemma provides an implicit definition of these curves.
Lemma 3 Conditions (3) and (4) imply a unique well defined continuously differentiable function g : R 2 ++ → R 2 + such that e(1) = g 1 (·, e 3 (1)) and e 3 (1) = g 2 (e(1), ·).
Proof : Use (3) and (4) and lemma 2 to define the continuous function f :
Hence the Jacobian has strictly negative entries on the diagonal. Note that f (x, y) −→
∞, i = 1, 2 and by continuity of f (·, ·), we have that for each a ∈ R 2 + there exists a unique b ∈ R 2 ++ such that f (a, b) = 0. Because the Jacobian of f is invertible for all (a, b) ∈ R 2 + × R 2 ++ , the implicit function theorem 9 implies that there exists a unique continuously differentiable function g : g(x) ) .
9 See Munkres (1994) .
Lemma 4 (Proposition 3) For eachv ≥ 1 and q ∈ (0, 1) there exists a pair (e * (1), e * (v)) such that conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied.
Proof : For g : R 2 + → R 2 + as defined in the proof of lemma 3 we have g(0) = ( 2 9 q 2 + 1 2 q(1−q), 2 9 (1−q) 2v + 1 2 q(1−q)v) and g(x) −→ x→∞ 2 9 (q 2 ,v(1−q) 2 ). By continuity, g : R + → R + is bounded by some (K, K) ∈ R 2 . By Brouwer's fixed-point theorem there exists a point x * ∈ [0, K] 2 with g(x * ) = x * for K < ∞ large enough. Define e * (1) = x * 1 and e * (v) = x * 2 . Note that lemmata 2, 3 or 4 are valid for any q ∈ (0, 1) andv ≥ 1.
Lemma 5 If e * (1) and e * (v) satisfy conditions (3) and (4), then e * (v) > e * (1) for allv > 1.
Proof : Consider some fixed point x of g(·) with x 1 ≥ x 2 .
As − 1 2 < − 1 2v ∀v > 1, we have that f 1 (x, g(x)) < f 2 (x, g(x)), a contradiction to the definition of g(·). Hence x 1 < x 2 .
Theorem 1 For eachv ≥ 1 and q ∈ (0, 1) there exists a unique pair (e * (1), e * (v)) such that conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied.
Proof :
We show that at any fixed point x * and in the direction of increasing x 2 , the graph of g 1 (·) intersects the graph of g 2 (·) coming from {(x 1 , x 2 ) : x 2 < g 2 (x)} which is the shaded area in figure 10 . Figure 10 : At any fixed point the graph of g 1 (·) must hit the graph of g 2 (·) from the direction of the shaded area.
If ∂g 2 ∂x 1 (x, g(x)) = 0, this is trivially the case as g 1 (·) has finite first derivatives at any point x. If ∂g 2 ∂x 1 (x * , g(x * )) > 0, we need to show that ∂g 1 ∂x 2 (x * , g(x * )) is strictly lower than the inverse of the slope of g 2 (·) at x * and if ∂g 2 ∂x 1 (x * , g(x * )) < 0 we need to show that the slope of ∂g 1 ∂x 2 (x * , g(x * )) is strictly greater than the inverse of the slope of g 2 (·) at x * . This amounts to the condition ∂g 1 ∂x 2 (x * , g(x * )) · ∂g 2 ∂x 1 (x * , g(x * )) < 1 (9) at any fixed point x * . If there were multiple fixed points, the graph of g 1 (·) would have to interset g 2 (·) coming from the white area for at least one fixed point, a contradiction. Lemma 3 states the partial derivatives of g(·) and by lemma 5 we know that any fixed point satisfies x * 2 > x * 1 and hence ∂f 1 ∂x 2 (x * , g(x * )) < 0 and ∂f 2 ∂y 2 (x * , g(x * )) < 0. With these statements we can show that condition (9) is equivalent to
for any fixed point x * , where we use the g-determinant for 2 × n matrices as defined by Radić (2005) . Elementary rearrangements imply
Proof of Proposition 5: Use the binding conditions (5) to (8) Consider anyŷ ∈ R 4 . Suppose G αj (0,ŷ) > 0. As lim u j →∞ G αj (u,ŷ) ∈ (0, −∞) for each j and as G αj (u,ŷ) is continuous in u j , there exists someû j such that G αj (û,ŷ) = 0. Suppose G αj (0,ŷ) < 0. Then G αj (0,ŷ) = F αj (0,ŷ) < 0. Defineû such that u j = F αj (0,ŷ). Then G αj (û,ŷ) = F αj (0,ŷ) − F αj (0,ŷ) = 0. Therefore, for eachŷ ∈ R 4 there exist aû α ∈ R 4 such that G α (û α ,ŷ) = 0.
We consider now the matrix ∂ + Gα ∂u (u, y) ∈ R 4 × R 4 with ∂ + G αi ∂u j = lim h 0 G αi (u + h · e j , y) − G αi (u, y) h , i, j = 1, . . . , 4 .
For u ∈ R 4 with u j ≥ 0 we have
For u ∈ R 4 with u j < 0 we have
Note that in our special setup we can simplify the general analysis of Robinson (1991) .
As ∂F αi ∂u i (u, y) < 0 for all (u, y) ∈ R 4 × R 4 + , the matrix ∂ + Gα ∂u (u, y) has full rank for all (u, y) ∈ R 4 × R 4 + . By the implicit function theorem, for any point (û,ŷ) ∈ R 4 × R 4 + with G α (û,ŷ) = 0 there is a neighborhood H of y 0 , H ⊂ R 4 + and a unique continuous function g α : H → R 4 such that g α (ŷ) =û and G α (g α (y), y) = 0 ∀ y ∈ H.
As ∂F αi ∂y j (u, y) ≤ 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , 4 there exists a finite K ∈ R + such that g α (y) ∈ [0, K] 4 for all y ∈ R 4 + and by Brouwer's fixed point theorem there exists some y * α ∈ [0, K] 4 such that y * α = g α (y * α ). For each fixed point y * α we have that F αi (g α (y * α ) + , y * α ) ≤ 0 for i = 1, . . . , 4 and by lemma 1 F αi (g α (y * α ) + , y * α ) < 0 implies g α (y * α ) + i = 0. Therefore g α (y * α ) + satisfies statement i) of the lemma for α > 0.
For the following arguments consider some α > 0 and suppose there exists some y * α ∈ R 4 + with F α (y * α , y * α ) ≤ 0 and F αi (y * α , y * α ) < 0 ⇒ y * αi = 0. Suppose y * α1 = y * α3 = 0. Then there exists some α > 0 such that F α1 (g α (y * α ), y * α ) > 0 ∀ 0 < α < α, a contradiction. Hence y * α1 + y * α3 > 0. Suppose y * α1 > y * α2 ≥ 0. Then F α1 (g α (y * α ), y * α ) < F α2 (g α (y * α ), y * α ) ≤ 0, a contradiction to y * α1 > 0. Hence y * α1 ≤ y * α2 . Suppose y * α3 > y * α4 ≥ 0. Then F α3 (g α (y * α ), y * α ) < F α4 (g α (y * α ), y * α ) ≤ 0, a contradiction to y * α3 > 0. Hence y * α3 ≤ y * α4 . Suppose y * α2 = 0. Then y * α1 = 0 and F α3 (g α (y * α ), y * α ) < 0 and hence y * α3 = 0, a contradiction to y * α1 + y * α3 > 0. Hence y * α2 > 0.
Suppose y * α4 = 0. Then y * α3 = 0 and F α1 (g α (y * α ), y * α ) < 0 and hence y * α1 = 0, a contradiction to y * α1 + y * α3 > 0. Hence y * α4 > 0.
Therefore y * αi +y * αj > 0 for any i, j = 1, . . . , 4, i = j. As F α (u, y) is continuous in α at any (u, y) = (y * α , y * α ) with y * αi + y * αj > 0, i, j = 1, . . . , 4, i = j, we have that y * α → α→0 e * = (e * (1), e * 3 (1), e * (v), e * 3 (v)), where e * satisfies statements i) and ii) of the lemma.
Suppose lim
v→∞ e * (v) < ∞. As 8 v −→ v→∞ 0 and as e * (1) < e * (v) we have that e * 3 (1) −→ v→∞ ∞ such that (6) can be satisfied. But then the inequality in (7) is strict and e * 3 (1) = 0, a contradiction. Analogue arguments imply that e * 3 (v) −→ v→∞ ∞. Therefore we have (5) −→ v→∞ q 2 · e 3 (1) (2e(1) + e 3 (1)) 2 ≤ 2 (7) −→ v→∞ q 2 · 2e(1) (2e(1) + e 3 (1)) 2 ≤ 1 Observe that (5) is strict implies e(1) = 0 which implies (7) is strict which implies e 3 (1) = 0 which implies that (7) is strict, hence e(1) −→ v→∞ 0 ⇔ e 3 (1) −→ v→∞ 0. Hence, if e(1) or e 3 (1) −→ v→∞ 0 then e(1) + e 3 (1) −→ v→∞ 0, a contradiction.
Hence lim v→∞ e(1), e 3 (1) > 0 and the inequalities in (5) and (7) must be binding forv → ∞. The unique solution to these two equations is e * (1) = q 2 · 1 18 and e * 3 (1) = q 2 · 2 9 . This proves statement iii of the lemma.
lim v→1 e(v) = lim v→1 e(1) and lim v→1 e 3 (v) = lim v→1 e 3 (1) follows by symmetry. Conditions (6) collapses to (5) which reduces to e 3 (1) (2·e(1)+e 3 (1)) 2 ≤ 2 and condition (8) collapses to (7) which reduces to e(1) (2·e(1)+e 3 (1)) 2 ≤ 1 2 . As before we have lim v→1 e(v), e 3 (v) > 0 and both inequalities must be binding. The unique solution to these two equations is e * (1) = 1 18 and e * 3 (1) = 2 9 . This proves statement iv of the lemma.
